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Anticompetitive patent acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry 








Pharmaceutical companies use various strategies to protect their market monopoly. One 
of such practices is an acquisition of a patent developed by a third party. Such acquisitions 
allow pharmaceutical companies to strengthen their market power by extending the life of 
the product; for instance, by acquiring patents that cover alternative non-infringing 
versions of the monopolist’s own product, or acquiring the patent that covers an 
improvement of its current product. Both the US and EU case law condemn such practices 
as an abuse of monopoly power. This Article discusses patent acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry focusing on two recent EU and US cases investigated by the 
competition authorities. 
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Access to medicines is increasingly becoming a priority matter not only for developing countries, but 
also for developed countries. Prohibitively high prices on drugs, coupled with the decreasing level of 
innovative and effective new medicines that reach the market, have become a bitter reality that the 
world is facing today. Therefore, states are determined to protect patients by facilitating generic 
competition through various legal and economic mechanisms, while also encouraging originator 
companies to engage in research and development of innovative medicines.1  
 
The problem of access is exacerbated by the fact that, while undertaking an important role of developing 
drugs and bringing them to market, pharmaceutical companies may also engage in business practices 
that cause a restricted access to medicines by charging high prices on their products or reducing their 
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availability by other means. When such situations occur, competition law plays a crucial role in 
protecting public interests.2  
 
Competition authorities of the EU and US are very active in policing abusive behaviour of 
pharmaceutical companies given the key importance of the industry. In 2008, the EU Commission 
launched an investigation into the EU pharmaceutical industry acknowledging that it was not working 
well, and pursuing the goal of finding the reasons for this problem.3 It found that originator companies 
use a variety of instruments to extend the commercial life of their medicines that contribute to the 
delay of generic competition.4 These practices include patent filing strategies, life cycle strategies for 
second generation products,5 reverse payment agreements,6 patent-related exchanges and litigation, 
oppositions and appeals, interventions before marketing authorisation and/or pricing and 
reimbursement bodies. While some practices, such as patent filing and life-cycle strategies, remain 
only a ‘concern’ of the competition authorities, other practices, such as reverse payment agreements, 
have gained considerable attention from competition authorities in different jurisdictions.7 Also, 
among the practices under the vigilant control of the competition authorities are acquisitions of 
externally-developed patents. This Article will discuss anticompetitive patent acquisitions in the 
pharmaceutical industry with a specific focus on two recent EU and US cases investigated by the 
competition authorities. 
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1. Patent acquisitions by pharmaceutical companies  
 
Patent acquisitions are generally viewed as pro-competitive as they facilitate dissemination of 
knowledge. A transfer of the technology to those who are capable of using it, in theory, should ensure 
its effective utilisation, and lead, for example, to the development of more efficacious active substances 
or lower production costs.8 Acquisition of a patent developed by a third party may also be 
anticompetitive, when it strengthens monopoly power of a dominant firm and eliminate competition.9 
 
External patent acquisitions that may enhance dominant position may relate to patents on improvement 
or substitute (alternative) technologies. Improvement patents relate to the acquirer’s own monopolistic 
product and improve it either in terms of quality, act as an essential component of a product or extend 
its market exclusivity. Such an acquisition may allow the monopolist to extend its monopoly beyond 
the period of a basic patent that covers its product.10 Patents that cover alternative technologies are 
generally acquired in order to remove the access to those technologies from the market and prevent 
rivals from using them. Such acquisitions essentially eliminates potential or actual competition and 
maintains monopoly power with respect to the acquirer’s own product.11  As a general presumption, an 
acquisition by a dominant company of exclusive rights to an alternative technology is an exclusionary 
practice.12  
 
In the pharmaceutical industry, external patent acquisitions allow pharmaceutical companies to 
strengthen their market power by extending the life of the product; for instance, by buying out patents 
that cover alternative, non-infringing versions of manufacturing processes of the monopolist’s own 
product or acquiring the patent that covers an improved formulation of its existent product. Both the 




1.1. The EU Commission decision in Perindopril: acquisition of alternative technologies  
 
In order to protect its product against generic competition, pharmaceutical companies use various 
strategies. These strategies are usually used together, so that if one has failed to achieve the attempted 
result of blocking competitors, another will ensure that the protection is maintained. The typical 
example of such a toolbox employed by pharmaceutical companies is the Perindopril case. 13 In 2014, 
after its in-depth investigation, the EU Commission concluded that Les Laboratories Servier, a French 
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pharmaceutical originator company, violated EU competition law by engaging in patent acquisitions 
and reverse payment settlements with respect to its most successful blockbuster drug Perindopril, an 
angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor used for the treatment of cardiovascular diseases (e.g. high 
blood pressure). In its decision, the Commission drew a broad picture of Servier’s anti-generics strategy 
that had the objective to delay or prevent generic entry by making use of a great variety of instruments.  
 
The Commission found that Servier started to devise, constantly update and implement its anti-generics 
strategy from the late 1990s onwards. The main objective of the company was to postpone generic entry 
that on the most important markets, such as the UK and France, would happen, in principle, after the 
expiry of the perindopril compound patent, i.e. in 2003/2005 respectively.  By means of its strategies, 
however, Servier succeeded in substantially delaying generic entry. As was noted by Servier itself for 
the UK market, its anti-generics strategy had been very successful: ‘4 years gained = great success’.14 
 
As one of the most important elements of Servier’s anti-generics strategy, the Commission described 
Servier’s patenting practice. The initial patent protection of Perindopril was based on several key 
patents that cover its basic compound, as well as its processes of production and synthesis. Servier knew 
that after the expiration of the compound patent, it could only rely on the protection of its secondary 
process patents. However, Servier was not confident in relying solely on these process patents, as they 
would not afford absolute protection against generic entry, because competitors might develop 
alternative non-infringing production processes.15 Therefore, it was decided to strengthen the patent 
protection for Perindopril by means of filing for blocking patents. The strategic objective was to 
neutralise the arrival of generics through blocking all the non-infringing alternatives that could 
potentially be industrialised.16  
 
Despite the general success of this strategy in preventing generic competition, some generic companies, 
nevertheless, tried to develop alternative non-infringing methods to produce Perindopril or to obtain 
different crystalline forms of Perindopril which were not patent protected.  Non-infringing technologies 
available for the manufacture of Perindopril were, in any case, limited and required substantial 
investment and research by the generic companies.17  
 
When Servier found out that a few generic companies successfully developed non-infringing 
formulations of Perindopril, it pursued the tactic of their acquisition in order to remove the possibility 
of potential competition. Such acquisitions meant that these technologies would no longer be available 
for generic companies seeking to enter the market with an alternative non-infringing form of Perindopril 
that was not patent protected by Servier.18 When explaining the reasons behind the patent acquisition 
of alternative technologies for the production of Perindopril developed by generic firms, Servier stated 
that the purpose of such an acquisition was to improve their manufacturing processes and thus increase 
production capacity while optimising production costs. However, as the Commission found, in contrast 
to this statement, the purpose of an acquisition was to strengthen the protection of its own forms of 
Perindopril. 
 
                                                          
14  ibid, para 4. 
15  ibid, para 115. 
16  ibid, para 117. 
17  ibid, para 140. 
18  ibid, para 139. 




In particular, Servier concluded two agreements, which removed alternative technologies from the 
market. It also acquired patents in the context of its patent settlement agreements with two other 
competitors. Although the first acquisition was not disclosed by the Commission in its decision, it 
mentioned that Servier acquired a patent application and a ‘chemical dossier’. It further stated that the 
seller was at the advanced stage of developing Perindopril API (active pharmaceutical ingredient), that 
did not infringe any of the Servier’s patent rights, and applied for a process patent for this API. The 
seller also entered into negotiations with a generic company with respect to the marketing of the API 
by this generic company. This agreement effectively ended any independent development of Perindopril 
based on the acquired process.19 
 
The second acquisition of an alternative technology was from a Swiss company Azad that included a 
patent application and related international extensions and know-how transfer (that included four 
synthesis routes for the manufacturing of Perindopril). Servier acknowledged that the Azad patents did 
not infringe on Servier’s patents and agreed to acquisition in order to ‘strengthen the defence mechanism 
for its own alpha, beta and gamma forms of Perindopril’. For the Azad assignment, Servier committed 
to pay the amount of EUR 13,374,243. As a consequence of this acquisition Azad terminated all 
activities involving Perindopril and ceased to be a potential source of API for generic companies.20 As 
was concluded by the Commission, the purpose of acquisition was to ‘hamper generic entry rather than 
to pursue efficiencies from the acquired technology’.21 The Commission further found evidence that 
Servier did not use the acquired technology and listed it among patents qualified as protective measures 
against generics, i.e. ‘blocking patents’. 
 
Servier also closely followed the development of two advanced sources of Perindopril which obtained, 
or were close to obtaining, a marketing authorisation: Krka and Lupin. Being in litigation with these 
two companies over the infringement and validity of Servier's patents and revocation action against its 
core patent22 respectively, Servier concluded a patent settlement agreement with both companies, which 
also included a transfer of their technologies to Servier.23 
 
The Commission concluded that these acquisitions deviated from competition on the merits, as those 
technologies were not excluded from the market because of Servier's superior technology, but because 
Servier aimed to strengthen its protection against generic entry, removing independent sources of 
competition by means of acquisitions.24 Therefore, the Commission found that patent acquisitions are 
considered to be a violation under Article 101 TFEU. It was also found that the combination of the 
patent acquisitions and the reverse payment settlements amounted to an abuse of a dominant position 
by Servier pursuant to Article 102 of the Treaty.25 
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1.2. The FTC Decision in Bioval: acquisition of an improvement patent 
In 2002, In re Bioval Corp.26, the FTC claimed that the Biovail Corporation’s acquisition of an exclusive 
patent license for Tiazac was illegal. The Commission further claimed that in order to maintain its 
monopoly, Biovail wrongfully listed the acquired license in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 
‘Orange Book’ for the purpose of blocking generic competition of its Tiazac drug. The Commission 
considered these actions as a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
as well as considered them as unlawful monopolisation in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
 
Thus, Bioval is a producer of Tiazac, a diltiazem-based prescription drug used to treat high blood 
pressure and chronic chest pain. Patent protection on the Tiazac active ingredient expired, but it was 
still covered by a patent on its extended-release formulation. Tiazac was approved for sale in the US in 
1995, and Bioval started to market it shortly after. It was an important product for the company with 
the sales of almost $200 million in 2000. In 1998, a generic company, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
submitted an ANDA to the FDA to market a generic version of Tiazac. At that time, the only patent 
listed in the Orange Book as claiming Tiazac was ‘791 patent, which covered the aspect of the extended-
release formulation of Tiazac. In response to the submission of the generic company, Bioval filed a 
patent infringement lawsuit, alleging that the generic version would infringe the ‘791 patent. This 
triggered a thirty month stay provision, precluding the FDA from granting a final approval to the 
generic. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the CAFC) confirmed the lower court decision 
to reject the claim, holding that the generic version did not infringe upon the Bioval’s patent. The FDA 
tentatively approved generic version which means that it would have been eligible for the final approval 
upon expiration of the 30 month stay, which the FDA would have granted on 13 February 2001. 
However, because of the Bioval’s anticompetitive actions, the final approval was not granted. 
 
In December 2000, the US ‘463 patent was granted to the founder of DOV Pharmaceuticals. The 
product covered by this patent is a unique formulation of diltiazem (the same active pharmaceutical 
ingredient as in Biovail’s Tiazac), which combines both an immediate-release and an extended-release 
form of diltiazem. In January 2001, Bioval managed to obtain an exclusive licence on this patent and 
immediately listed it in the Orange Book, alleging that it covered the approved formulation of Tiazac. 
According to the FTC, Biovail was aware that the ‘463 patent did not cover the Bioval’s formulation of 
Tiazac and, therefore, it did not need this patent in order to manufacture and sell its existing drug, and 
it could have continued to do so without infringing the ‘463 patent. However, the consequence of such 
a listing was that the FDA was no longer permitted to grant Andrx final approval to launch its generic 
version of Tiazac in February 2001. Andrx, instead, was required to file a new certification to the FDA 
concerning the ‘463 patent, further delaying its market entry. In subsequent court proceedings, Bioval 
alleged that the ‘463 patent covered a new formulation of Tiazac that Biovail developed only after it 
acquired the exclusive license and listed the ‘463 patent, rather than covering the version of Tiazac that 
Biovail had been marketing. However, at the same time, in contrast to its position in the court, Bioval 
made the FDA believe that the ‘463 patent covered its current product and therefore should be listed.27  
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The FTC in its complaint stated that Biovail did not need a license, especially an exclusive one, to the 
‘463 patent in order to make and sell its FDA-approved Tiazac product. Biovail’s acquisition of the 
exclusive license to the ‘463 patent raised substantial barriers to entry into the relevant market and gave 
Biovail the power to exclude competition, thereby protecting Biovail’s monopoly in the relevant 
market. The FTC and Bioval entered a consent decree, under which Bioval agreed to divest the 
exclusive licence related to the ‘463 patent.  
 
Conclusions 
External patent acquisitions, although encouraged by patent law, may nevertheless raise antitrust 
concerns. This article discussed two examples of such anticompetitive conduct. In the Perindopril case, 
a dominant firm acquired patents from other pharmaceutical companies, which succeeded in developing 
alternative, non-infringing formulations of the monopolist’s product, in order to remove these 
technologies from the market and in this way eliminating potential competition. In the Bioval case, the 
monopolist pursued the aim of extending its monopoly power through acquisition of an exclusive patent 
licence that covered improvement of its own product and that also allowed the company to eliminate 
competition. Both monopolists pursued the same goal, i.e. strengthening and extending monopoly 
power by means of patent acquisitions.  
 
The competition authorities when analysing these patent acquisitions took into account the market 
position of the acquirers at the time of the acquisitions. In particular, they found that the companies 
possessed substantial market power, and that such acquisitions strengthened their monopoly positions. 
The analysis also took into account the nature, number and value of the patents acquired in relation to 
the market for competing products, whether the acquirer intended to use the acquired patents and 
whether the acquirer needed an acquisition of exclusive rights in order to produce its current product. 
Finally, it may be inferred from the analysis above that the acquisition may be found anticompetitive 
when its purpose is to ‘hamper generic entry rather than to pursue efficiencies from the acquired 
technology’.28  
 
To conclude, because of the crucial importance of the pharmaceutical industry, and the consequences 
that anticompetitive strategies of pharmaceutical companies may have with respect to access to 
medicines, the competition authorities should be encouraged to pursue these practices more vigorously. 
Control of patent strategies in the pharmaceutical industry will facilitate generic competition that 
benefits consumers. It will also force pharmaceutical companies to direct their resources away from the 
strategies that harm competition and stifle innovation and towards the research and development of new 
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